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Abstract 
A strong link between citizen preferences and public policy is one of the key goals and criteria 
of democratic governance. Yet, our knowledge about the extent to which public policies on 
specific issues are in line with citizen preferences in Europe is limited. This article reports on 
the first study of the link between public opinion and public policy that covers a large and 
diverse sample of concrete public policy issues in 31 European democracies. The findings 
demonstrate a strong positive relationship and a substantial degree of congruence between 
public opinion and the state of public policy. Also examined is whether political institutions, 
including electoral systems and the horizontal and vertical division of powers, influence the 
opinion-policy link. The evidence for such effects is very limited, which suggests that the same 
institutions might affect policy representation in countervailing ways through different 
mechanisms. 
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Introduction 
It is a defining feature of any liberal and democratic political system that policy reflects the will 
of the people (see, e.g., Dahl 1956; Pitkin 1967; Przeworski 2010). The match between public 
preferences and public policy cannot be expected to be perfect and instantaneous. In some cases 
– for example, when it comes to possible infringements of fundamental human rights or the 
repression of minorities – it might not even be normatively desirable. However, no political 
system that allows for gross, sustained and systematic differences between what the public 
wants and what policies the government delivers can be considered liberal and democratic (cf. 
Rehfeld 2009: 214). 
Therefore, it is important to assess how strong the link between public opinion and public 
policy is in order to obtain a comprehensive and nuanced picture of the quality of democracy 
in Europe. Yet, our knowledge about the link between public opinion and the public policies in 
place across European democracies is still limited. Previous studies have investigated a large 
number of countries but along very general dimensions, like left-right (Powell 2006; Golder & 
Stramski 2010; Blais & Bodet 2006; Golder & Lloyd 2014; Ferland 2016), government 
spending (Wlezien & Soroka 2012) or broad policy areas (Hobolt & Klemmensen 2008; Soroka 
& Wlezien 2010). We contribute to this literature with a study of the link between public 
opinion and policy that simultaneously includes a large number of European countries, uses 
data on concrete policy outcomes and covers a relatively large number of different policy areas. 
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Specifically, we compare public opinion towards 20 specific policy issues with the status of 
these policies in 31 European countries in a cross-sectional design. Instead of relying on 
aggregate or indirect measures of policy, we determine the actual state of policy for specific 
policy issues within broader policy domains in each country. This approach has the advantage 
of not requiring the assumption that citizens’ policy preferences neatly map onto a single 
dimension, such as left-right or liberalism (Converse 1964; Lax & Phillips 2012), and allows 
us to measure opinion and policy on the same specific issues (Berry et al. 1993; Lax & Phillips 
2012; Wlezien 2017). 
The second aim of this study is to examine whether the opinion-policy link varies with 
some of the political institutions that differentiate the political systems found across Europe. It 
is widely believed that political institutions can fundamentally affect the quality of democratic 
governance. Yet, in many cases, opposing theoretical expectations exist about the nature and 
direction of an institution's influence. For instance, electoral systems with proportional 
representation (PR) rules are more likely to produce multi-party governments, which can make 
legislating in line with public opinion difficult (Wlezien & Soroka 2012; Jones et al. 2009; 
Coman 2015). At the same time, governments in majoritarian systems might not always have 
the incentives to follow the median voter either (Persson & Tabellini 2004; Hobolt & 
Klemmensen 2008; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002). 
Similarly, the horizontal separation of powers embodied in institutions like bicameralism 
or rules allocating considerable discretion to the executive vis-à-vis the legislature may 
influence the opinion-policy nexus in contingent ways, which do not make them generally better 
or worse at producing a strong link between opinion and policy. On the one hand, veto players 
can act as safeguards to protect the public from policies that only serve a minority (Wlezien & 
Soroka 2012). On the other hand, they can also prevent governments from enacting policies 
that are congruent with public opinion (Tsebelis 1995; Hobolt & Klemmensen 2008). Hence, 
the provisional conclusion that emerges from the theoretical predictions of the existing 
literature, as well as the empirical findings, is that institutions can steer policy simultaneously 
towards and away from public opinion. Therefore, rather than arguing that specific institutions 
affect congruence in a single direction, we suggest that countries with different institutional set-
ups may exhibit little to no net systematic differences in the strength of the relationship and 
congruence between opinion and policy. The exception is the vertical separation of powers 
through multilevel government in federalist systems and European Union member states, where 
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a lower clarity of responsibility might lead to public opinion being less well reflected in policy 
(Wlezien & Soroka 2012). 
Our sample of 31 countries features significant variation along this set of institutional 
dimensions, while the 20 policy issues are of differing salience and from various policy types 
and areas. This allows us to explore the potential impact of institutions on a diverse set of issues, 
extending previous research examining the association between institutions and the opinion-
policy link among a small number of countries (Hobolt & Klemmensen 2008), among many 
countries but with respect to overall government spending (Wlezien & Soroka 2012) or at the 
subnational level (Lax & Phillips 2012). 
We find a strong and statistically significant positive relationship between public support 
for a policy and the likelihood that the policy is in place. Moreover, in two-thirds of the cases, 
we observe that policy is congruent with the opinion of the majority of citizens. Thus, the 
opinion-policy link and level of congruence observed in the European countries are not perfect, 
yet relatively high compared to the American states (cf. Lax & Phillips 2012). At the same time, 
we find no association between the two aspects of the opinion-policy linkage that we study and 
any of the institutional features we analyse, apart from the number of chambers in parliament. 
We are led to conclude that the different and often opposing ways in which electoral systems, 
the horizontal division of powers and the vertical separation of powers can be expected to affect 
policy representation may cancel out in the aggregate. The study thus contributes with new 
empirical insights to the debate on the impact of political institutions on the opinion-policy 
linkage and the quality of democracy more generally. 
 
The opinion-policy nexus 
Due to the centrality of the link between public opinion and policy to the core concept of 
representative democracy, a range of studies have used multiple approaches and data sources 
to examine it. They have investigated how closely public opinion matches different indicators 
of public policy, such as the degree of policy liberalism, government agendas, budgetary 
spending or specific policy issues (e.g., Page & Shapiro 1983; Erikson et al. 1993; Wlezien 
1995; Monroe 1998; Jones et al. 2009; Lax & Phillips 2009, 2012). The vast majority of 
research on the opinion-policy linkage focuses on single or small numbers of countries (e.g., 
Burstein 2014; Lax & Phillips 2012; Monogan et al. 2009; Stimson et al. 1995; Rasmussen et 
al. 2018; Wlezien 1995; Soroka & Wlezien 2004) and often uses aggregate indicators of policy 
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(Stimson et al. 1995; Erikson et al. 2002) or analyses broad policy areas, such as labour and 
employment or defence (e.g., Jennings & John 2009; Wlezien 1995; Bevan & Rasmussen 
2017). Recent years have witnessed an increase in the number of studies that take a comparative 
approach, often investigating the role of political institutions. However, they rely on broader 
measures of policy than specific policy issues (e.g., Wlezien & Soroka 2012; Hobolt & 
Klemmensen 2008; Kang & Powell 2010) or focus on one policy area, such as immigration or 
social welfare (e.g., Eichenberg & Stoll 2003; Brooks & Manza 2006; Peters & Ensink 2014; 
Morales et al. 2015). 
The problem with looking at a single policy area is that we might not be able to generalise 
findings about the opinion-policy linkage and the impact of political institutions and other 
cross-country differences to other policy areas as they may differ for different policy domains 
and issues of varying salience. Meanwhile, the use of broad policy categories or dimensions 
does not consider the possibility that the preferences of citizens and political elites’ over specific 
policies within broader policy areas are not necessarily consistent. In Golder and Ferland's 
(2017) words, a ‘strong positive correlation between policy adoption and state ideology says 
little about whether implemented policies are congruent with citizens’ preferences because we 
do not know how broad measures of state ideology should be translated into preferences for 
actual policies’ (cf. also Burstein 2014; Lax & Phillips 2012). 
Several studies overcome this problem by comparing public opinion with policy change 
or with existing legislation across a range of specific policy issues. This approach also allows 
examining how the opinion-policy linkage varies with issue characteristics. Yet, since these 
studies have generally been restricted to a single country (cf. Brettschneider 1996; Brooks 1987, 
1990; Burstein 2014; Gilens 2012; Gilens & Page 2014; Lax & Phillips 2012; Monroe 1979, 
1998; Page & Shapiro 1983; Petry & Mendelsohn 2004) 1 , it is difficult to assess the 
applicability of their findings in other contexts. In order to simultaneously achieve the aims of 
making observations that are – to a certain extent – generalisable across both countries and 
issues, and of avoiding a potential mismatch between public opinion and policy, we examine 
variation in the opinion-policy linkage across a large set of specific policy issues and a high 
number of national contexts. 
                                                 
1 Brooks (1985) is an exception to this pattern and includes information about opinion and policy on specific issues 
in three countries. 
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We focus on two aspects of the opinion-policy linkage: the relationship between public opinion 
and policy and congruence between them. The former refers to the idea that changes in public 
opinion should be reflected in corresponding changes in policy. This relationship is often 
understood in a dynamic way, with policy being responsive to changes in public opinion (Achen 
1978). Yet, it is equally possible that a high correlation between opinion and policy exists 
because citizens have adapted their preferences to information and arguments provided to them 
by political elites (Esaiasson & Holmberg 1996; Holmberg 2011). This conceptual 
understanding is reflected in our methodological design: By examining the relationship between 
public opinion and policy measured at the same point in time across countries, we allow the 
causality between public opinion and policy to flow in both directions. In addition to the 
relationship between opinion and policy, we study congruence, which indicates whether the 
policy in place has the support of a majority of the population. Both aspects of policy 
representation capture important normative intuitions about the concept, are empirically distinct 
(Achen 1978), and need to be analysed separately (Lax & Phillips 2012)2. 
The impact of political institutions 
In addition to assessing the link between opinion and policy in Europe, we are interested in the 
extent to which, and why, it varies across countries. Political institutions are among the most 
prominent factors hypothesised to affect the opinion-policy linkage. The main institutional 
characteristics assumed to play a role in existing studies are electoral systems and the horizontal 
and vertical separation of powers in a country (Wlezien & Soroka 2012). While several studies 
have examined the effects of these institutions, they often conduct an analysis of policy 
responsiveness over time for a set of broader policy areas and in a limited number of countries 
(Hobolt & Klemmensen 2008; Soroka & Wlezien 2010; see also Wlezien and Soroka (2012) 
and Kang and Powell (2010) who cover many countries but only one dimension of public 
spending). In addition, several of the studies interested in assessing the impact of electoral 
institutions focus on left-right congruence between citizens and governments rather than on the 
link between public opinion and policy outputs (e.g., Blais & Bodet 2006; Ferland 2016; Golder 
& Stramski 2010; Golder & Lloyd 2014; Powell 2009). The expectations and findings of these 
previous studies vary quite substantially, which is partly due to the different ways in which they 
                                                 
2 Online Appendix A illustrates that the degree to which a change in public support for a policy is associated with 
a change in the likelihood of the policy being in place is not linearly related to congruence between opinion and 
policy. 
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conceptualise and measure representation. We adapt the expectations about the effects of 
institutions on representation to the opinion-policy link across a set of concrete policy issues in 
a cross-national design. 
Electoral systems 
The impact of electoral institutions on representation has been examined by looking at both 
ideological congruence and policy responsiveness. In the past, it was widely believed that PR 
systems generate a better match between public opinion and policy than majoritarian or 
plurality systems. After all, the system was designed with the aim of achieving a high level of 
vote-seat proportionality and, hence, guarantee the representation of as many views in society 
as possible (Lijphart 1984). Yet, while earlier studies provided support for this expectation (see 
Huber & Powell 1994; Powell 2000, 2006; McDonald et al. 2004), there is now widespread 
agreement that, through different mechanisms and if certain conditions are met, PR and 
majoritarian systems generate governments that represent citizens similarly well (Blais & Bodet 
2006; Ferland 2016; Golder & Stramski 2010; Golder & Lloyd 2014; Powell 2009; see also 
Golder & Ferland 2017). However, this literature conceptualises and measures representation 
in terms of congruence between the left-right positions of citizens and the government rather 
than between citizens’ policy preferences and policy outputs (cf. Kang & Powell 2010), which 
may be understood as coming later in the ‘chain’ of representation. While the ideological 
orientation of the government might be a powerful predictor of legislation, there are additional 
mechanisms through which electoral system characteristics may influence both the ability and 
the willingness of governments to change or maintain policy in line with the wishes of the 
public (cf. Coman 2015; Golder & Ferland 2017). 
An important factor is the policy-making dynamics of multi-party governments, which 
are more likely to emerge in PR systems where higher numbers of parties tend to enter 
parliament. Government coalitions require compromise (Müller & Strøm 2000). In such 
systems, it can be difficult to reach agreement and implement policy that would improve the 
representation of the public majority but hurt the constituencies of some coalition partners 
(Wlezien & Soroka 2012, 2015). In the words of Jones et al. (2009), coalition governments 
increase the ‘institutional friction’ that hinders policy change. Coman (2015) illustrates these 
dynamics with the example of spending cuts that are desired by the overall public but whose 
burden none of the coalition partners wants their constituencies to bear. But the issue also 
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pertains to other types of policy where the government parties disagree and use their veto 
powers (Tsebelis 1995). 
What is more, single-party governments have a higher clarity of responsibility than multi-
party governments (Fisher & Hobolt 2010; Powell & Whitten 1993). If citizens can more easily 
determine which party is to praise or blame for a policy or its absence, and reward or punish it 
at the next election, government parties have a stronger incentive to bring policy in line with 
public opinion by adjusting legislation or by convincing the public of their policies. As a result, 
one might expect policy to reflect public opinion better under majoritarian than PR rules, even 
if governments represent the median voter equally well in both systems (Coman 2015; Golder 
& Ferland 2017). Support for such a prediction can for example be found in Wlezien and 
Soroka's (2012) work, which demonstrates that electoral system proportionality has the 
potential to decrease the strength of the link between spending preferences and actual spending. 
Yet, there are also factors that might weaken the opinion-policy link in majoritarian 
systems. Since in single-member district (SMD) systems seat shares are increased by winning 
pluralities in additional districts rather than gaining additional votes in ‘safe seats’, parties 
looking for re-election often have an incentive to please voters in a few pivotal districts rather 
than the nationwide median voter (Persson & Tabellini 2004; Hobolt & Klemmensen 2008). 
There is also evidence that SMD systems incentivise politicians to cultivate a personal rather 
than a party vote, resulting in representatives catering to the more narrow interest of their 
districts rather than those of the national public (Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002)3. In line with such 
a view, Hobolt and Klemmensen (2005) found that the government's policy intentions were less 
responsive to public opinion in the British plurality system than in the Danish proportional 
system. 
We are thus faced with different and partly opposing arguments for why majoritarian or 
PR systems might foster stronger opinion-policy linkages, and it is not entirely clear which side 
in the debate assembles more powerful mechanisms. This leaves the option that, in the 
aggregate, we may find no net differences in the strength of the opinion-policy linkage between 
the different electoral systems. 
                                                 
3 It should be noted, however, that electoral system characteristics other than the degree of proportionality, such 
as intra-party competition, also play important roles (see, e.g., Carey & Shugart 1995; Golden 2003; Hicken & 
Simmons 2008). 
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Horizontal division of powers 
Similar counteracting pressures are likely to exist with regard to the horizontal division of 
power between the executive and the legislative branches of government. It may be easier to 
adopt policy that reflects public opinion in systems where the legislature is more powerful. 
Legislatures in parliamentary systems face fewer constraints when passing laws desired by the 
public than those in (semi-)presidential systems, in which checks and balances are generally 
stronger (Tsebelis 1995). Using a similar argument, Jones et al. (2009) posit that the 
requirement that laws enjoy the support of both president and parliament may be another source 
of friction hampering the adoption of policy. Particularly – though not exclusively – in cases 
where the presidency and the parliament are controlled by different parties, presidential and 
semi-presidential systems can experience gridlock (Monroe 1998). In fact, even parliamentary 
systems display variation in the division of powers between legislative and executive (as a result 
of, for instance, differences in the government's ability to influence the legislative agenda and 
the degree of parliamentary scrutiny), which may lead to differences in the opinion-policy link. 
However, a strong horizontal division of powers may not only affect the opinion-policy 
linkage in a negative manner. Similarly to veto players within government coalitions, 
requirements to obtain executive-legislative agreement can affect positively the opinion-policy 
linkage by blocking policy changes that are not desired by the public (cf. Hobolt & Klemmensen 
2008). For example, Wlezien and Soroka (2012) find that weaker executive discretion 
strengthens the link between the public's spending preferences and actual spending. Hobolt and 
Klemmensen (2008) provide a similar explanation for their finding of high responsiveness in 
the United States. Whether a stronger horizontal division of power weakens or strengthens the 
opinion-policy link in a specific case thus likely depends on whether the public desires a policy 
change or favours the status quo. With such counteracting pressures, there might thus be no net 
effect of the horizontal distribution of power on the opinion-policy linkage. 
A similar argument applies to bicameral and unicameral systems: an upper chamber with 
(strong) veto powers can generate ‘friction’ and thwart policy change that is in the interest of 
the public (Jones et al. 2009), but it can also prevent unpopular decisions – especially if the two 
chambers are controlled by different parties (Tsebelis 1995). Again, whether a more extensive 
division of powers is beneficial for stimulating a strong linkage between opinion and policy is 
thus contingent on situational factors, providing the possibility that we find no net differences 
in the strength of the opinion-policy link between the different systems. 
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Vertical division of powers 
In complex systems of multilevel governance it should be more difficult for voters to assign 
responsibility for policy as it is often unclear which government level deals with a particular 
issue (see also Jones et al. 2009). This lowers the pressure on governments to respond to the 
public's wishes as they are less likely to be punished for it (Soroka & Wlezien 2004; Wlezien 
& Soroka 2012). The opinion-policy link at the national level might thus be weaker in countries 
with federal systems. Similarly, the representation of public opinion in national policy that is 
not affected by EU legislation is likely to be lower in countries that are members of the EU, 
since the division of competences between the EU and the national level is not always clear-
cut. The blurring of responsibilities may thus act as a strain on responsiveness not only in EU 
policy making itself (Alexandrova et al. 2016) but also in the spheres of national policy making 
analysed here. As a result, it can be expected that the opinion-policy linkage is weaker in 
countries which have a federal, as opposed to a unitary, system and in countries that are 
members of the EU. 
 
Data and method 
In order to investigate the link between public opinion and policy, we collected public opinion 
data and mapped policy for 20 policy issues in 31 European countries4. Our unit of analysis is 
a policy in a country. Since we aimed at analysing the same policy issues across countries, we 
systematically screened a set of cross-national public opinion surveys conducted among 
representative samples in at least 15 European countries, such as the Eurobarometer, European 
Social Survey and European Election Study, to single out questions about respondents’ 
preferences concerning specific policy issues. We selected 20 items in the period between 1998 
and 2013 that cover a broad range of different policy areas, including, among others, economic, 
health, defence and retirement policy, and which met our selection criteria. These criteria 
included, among others, that an item referred to a specific policy issue rather than a broad policy 
area (e.g., smoking bans in bars and pubs rather than health policy; military involvement in 
Afghanistan rather than defence policy) with national competence, that the response scale 
                                                 
4 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. For some 
policy issues, we only have data for a subset of these countries. 
11 
 
indicated respondents’ agreement or disagreement, and that it was possible to determine 
whether the policy was in place when the survey was conducted (i.e., questions asking about 
preferences for future changes in policy were excluded)5. The 20 policy issues, together with 
the year, the survey and the number of countries in which the item was asked, are listed in the 
Appendix at the end of the article. 
Although the set of policies covers a diverse range of policy areas, it does not constitute 
a random sample from the universe of policy issues. This universe is extremely difficult to 
define, and so far Burstein's (2014) is the only study of public opinion and policy that attempts 
it. Yet, while Burstein's interpretation of the set of all bills introduced in Congress as the 
universe of potential policies may be valid in the United States, it is not easily transferrable to 
the European context. In many European countries, governments have traditionally initiated the 
majority of laws and these proposals often have a high chance of being adopted (Andeweg & 
Nijzink 1995). Thus, information about potential policies with low chances of adoption is 
difficult to acquire. Furthermore, it would be virtually impossible to obtain public opinion data 
on a randomly selected sample of policy issues for a large number of countries. Selecting policy 
issues based on their availability in surveys is thus the best viable method for the moment for a 
cross-national study as ours. 
While there is certainly a risk that the results obtained on the basis of our sample cannot 
be generalised to other policy issues, this risk should be relatively low for several reasons. First, 
the issues cover a range of policy areas. Second, they vary strongly in salience, which has been 
shown to be an important predictor of the opinion-policy link (Lax & Phillips 2012; Monroe 
1998; Page & Shapiro 1983). Third, it is unlikely that the sample is biased due to an underlying 
logic that guides the inclusion of items in the surveys, as we rely on many different surveys. 
Moreover, this point is more relevant with respect to national surveys, where the selection of 
questions may be driven by current policy debates. While this may be the case for some of our 
policies, such as military involvement in Afghanistan, it is unlikely to be the case for many of 
them6. 
                                                 
5 Further details about the selection and coding of policy items can be obtained upon request from the authors. 
6 For the variety of ways through which questions make it into the Eurobarometer surveys, see Haverland et al. 
(2018). 
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Measuring policy and public opinion 
After selecting the policy issues, we mapped the state of public policy in the countries included 
at the time when the survey was conducted. Information was obtained from relevant documents 
issued by government agencies, international organisations, nongovernmental organisations, 
news outlets and academics. We first coded the policy status for each issue into an ordinal scale 
with the number of levels reflecting the potential variation in policy. These scales were then 
transformed into a harmonised scale with three levels, where 0 indicates that the policy was not 
in place, 1 that it was partly in place and 2 that it was fully in place. As an example, the scale 
for the smoking ban in bars and pubs reflects the differences in smoking regulation across 
Europe: 0 = no ban, 1 = partial ban with many or some exceptions (e.g., for small premises or 
smoking rooms) and 2 = complete ban. 
This ordinal measure of policy is used as the dependent variable in the analysis of the 
relationship between degrees of policy and public support. To analyse whether an increase in 
public support for a policy is related to a higher probability of the policy being in place, the 
policy measure is regressed on a variable that indicates the proportion of respondents in a 
country who were in favour of the policy among those who indicated a preference in favour or 
against it7. In order to test the hypothesised effects on the relationship between public opinion 
and policy, we interact public opinion with the respective variable. 
In a second step, we investigate opinion-policy congruence. This is operationalised as a 
dummy variable indicating whether policy was in line with the preferences of the majority of 
the citizens who expressed an opinion. In order to construct this variable, the original ordinal 
policy scales were collapsed into two categories: ‘policy in place’ or ‘no policy in place’. The 
policies coded as ‘partly in place’ were recoded as either ‘in place’ or ‘not in place’ depending 
on the particular issue, as shown in Online Appendix B, which provides information on the 
original scales and their transformation into the three-level and binary measures. The resulting 
congruence variable is dichotomous and takes the value 1 if (a) the policy is in place and the 
majority of the public is in favour or (b) the policy is not in place and the majority of the public 
is against it. Descriptive information about policy, public opinion and congruence can be found 
in Online Appendix C. 
                                                 
7 Respondents who answered ‘don't know’ or indicated neither a preference for nor against the policy were 
excluded, since including them when calculating the proportion is equivalent to inappropriately including them in 
the proportion that is against the policy. The average proportion of respondents in these categories is below 10 per 
cent. 
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Independent variables 
The independent variables in our study are a range of indicators of the political institutions 
whose effects we seek to analyse. In line with Wlezien and Soroka (2012), we measure the 
proportionality of the electoral system by using the effective number of parliamentary parties 
(ENPP), developed by Golder (2010) and extended by Bormann and Golder (2013). We use the 
value from the last national election that took place prior to the year in which the public opinion 
data was collected8. Next, we use two alternative measures of the executive-legislative balance. 
The first is a set of three regime type dummies indicating whether a country has a presidential, 
semi-presidential or parliamentary system (Cheibub et al. 2010)9. We also use a more nuanced 
index of the legislature's influence over the executive, drawn from the Parliamentary Powers 
Index (Fish & Kroenig 2009). Its components are seven dimensions of the national legislature's 
power – for instance, whether it can by itself impeach the president or replace the prime 
minister. It ranges from 0 to 9, with higher values indicating stronger influence. Our third 
measure of the horizontal division of powers is a dummy indicating whether a legislature is 
unicameral or has two chambers. 
Finally, we measure the vertical division of powers with two variables: the first indicates 
whether a country was a member of the European Union when public opinion and policy were 
measured and the second whether the country was unitary or federal or had a hybrid structure 
in which some central government powers were delegated to the regional level. The sources of 
all variables and each country's values are listed in Online Appendix D. 
Moreover, we control for the media salience of an issue, since the existing literature 
provides evidence that it strengthens the link between opinion and policy (e.g., Lax & Phillips 
2012). If a policy issue is salient in the public debate, and particularly in the news media, the 
public will have access to more information in order to form policy preferences. In turn, 
                                                 
8 The effective number of parties provides a more fine-grained measure of the proportionality of electoral systems 
than a binary or ordinal categorisation. However, we also estimated the models with a dummy variable indicating 
whether the main system used for lower house elections is based on plurality or PR rules, with the Gallagher Index, 
which measures the vote-seat disproportionality, and with the average district magnitude. The results are reported 
in Online Appendix E and do not substantially differ. 
9 Note that in our European sample there is no strong presidential system like the United States, with the possible 
exception of Cyprus. Cheibub et al. (2010) classify Switzerland as a presidential system because the executive 
cannot be removed by the legislature through a vote of no-confidence. However, since its executive is not popularly 
elected but emerges from its legislature, Switzerland is often not considered a presidential system (e.g., Samuels 
& Shugart 2010). This issue is accounted for through the measure of the legislature's influence over the executive. 
Moreover, when estimating the models without Switzerland, the coefficients of the regime type measure remain 
statistically insignificant. 
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political decision makers will receive more information about public opinion on salient issues 
on which they can base their decisions. The heightened visibility of and public attentiveness to 
policy makers’  (in-)actions on these issues may also increase the pressure on them to be 
responsive or to convince the public of their policies (cf., e.g., Page & Shapiro 1983). We 
measure media salience through the proportion of articles in the Financial Times’s coverage of 
Europe devoted to the policy issue over a three-year period, ending in the year in which the 
survey was conducted. Since most issues had very few articles devoted to them while a few 
were extremely salient (especially nuclear energy), we use the natural logarithm of the measure. 
The Financial Times certainly does not pay equal attention to the public and political debates 
in all European countries. However, in light of the difficulty of collecting data on the salience 
of the specific policy issues within each country, we believe that it constitutes a sufficiently 
valid proxy of the relative salience of the policy issues across countries. In addition, it can be 
argued that even if it were possible to measure media coverage of all 20 issues in the 31 
European countries, such a measure would be endogenous to policy adoption as issues would 
be more salient where they were on the government agenda (Lax & Phillips 2012)10. 
We nevertheless construct an alternative measure to test the robustness of the results. This 
is an indicator of public rather than media salience and is based on respondents’ answers to the 
‘most important problem’ (MIP) question posed by the European Election Study in each 
country. This measure is problematic, however, in that it links the specific policy issues in our 
sample to the very broad policy areas into which the responses are categorised. It is thus not a 
good indicator of the salience of the specific policy issue (e.g., respondents might consider the 
environment to be an important issue but not specifically whether plastic waste should be 
banned from landfills). Moreover, it does not indicate the degree of information transmission 
between the public and policy makers through the media, which is a crucial aspect of the causal 
mechanisms we proposed. We therefore use the media salience indicator in the models reported 
but provide details about the construction of the MIP measure and estimates of the models in 
Online Appendix F. 
In the congruence models, we also include a measure of the size of the opinion majority, 
whether in favour or against the policy (Lax & Phillips 2012). It accounts for the expectation 
that policy is more likely to be line with the majority of the public, the larger the majority. 
                                                 
10 We also use an alternative indicator based on the Financial Times data which uses the ranking of the issues 
based on their salience. It is strongly correlated with the measure used in the analysis (Pearson's r = 0.98, p < 
0.0005) and yields almost identical estimates. 
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Finally, we include the year in which public opinion and policy were measured in order to 
control for a potential time trend in the opinion-policy link as well as the fact that the more 
recent surveys tend to include more Central and Eastern European countries. All continuous 
independent variables are grand-mean centred. 
 
Results 
The relationship between opinion and policy in Europe 
Our cases are clustered within both policy issues and countries. In order to determine whether 
there are dependencies between the cases within a cluster for which we should account in our 
models, we first estimated multilevel ordered logit regression models with policy as the 
dependent variable and public opinion as the only independent variable11. In model 1, Table 1, 
we report the random variances of the intercept and the slope of public opinion at the level of 
policy issues. First of all, we find that public support for a policy is statistically significantly 
associated with the probability of the policy being in place. Second, this relationship varies 
systematically across policy issues, as the random slope variance suggests. Figure 1 illustrates 
this variation by showing the predicted coefficients of public opinion on policy for each issue 
when we allow the slope for public opinion to vary between issues. On some issues, including 
‘military in Afghanistan’ and ‘adoption by same-sex couples’, policy is clearly more strongly 
related to public opinion than on other issues, such as ‘ban on plastic waste in landfills’, where 
the relationship is in fact negative. We obtain a significant likelihood-ratio test comparing the 
model to an ordered logit regression without the random intercept and slope, which shows that 
the multilevel model with issues at the higher level has a significantly better fit.  
In model 2, we estimate the equivalent model with countries at the higher level and find 
that the slope variance is close to zero when we allow the relationship between public opinion 
and policy to vary between countries. This means that, as Figure 2 shows, the predicted 
coefficients of public opinion on policy are very similar across countries. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Ordered logit models rest on the assumption that the regression lines for the different outcomes are parallel. 
While we cannot test this assumption within the multilevel framework, we estimated a single-level ordered logit 
model equivalent to models 1 and 2 and conducted a Brant test, which indicated that the parallel lines assumption 
is not violated. 
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Table 1. Effects on the relationship between public opinion and policy 
 Model 
 1 2  3 4 
Public opinion (PO) 4.91 (1.81)** 2.62 (.42)*** 5.51 (2.67)* 4.18 (2.64) 
Electoral system measure  (ENPP)    -.11 (.08) -.08 (.09) 
     PO * ENPP   .26 (.46) .32 (.47) 
Regime type 
(reference=parliamentary)     
     Semi-presidential   .23 (.24)  
     Presidential   -.04 (.55)  
     PO * semi-presidential   -1.03 (1.20)  
     PO * presidential   -2.48 (2.36)  
Legislature’s influence    -.12 (.07) 
     PO * legislature’s influence    -.00 (.34) 
Bicameralism   .05 (.26) .18 (.26) 
     PO * bicameralism      -.41 (1.35) -.26 (1.38) 
Federalism (reference=unitary)     
     Hybrid   .36 (.33) .40 (.33) 
     Federal   .02 (.36) -.02 (.35) 
     PO * hybrid    1.78 (1.62) 1.73 (1.61) 
     PO * federal   2.67 (1.81) 2.34 (1.78) 
EU member   .10 (.43) .15 (.44) 
     PO * EU member   .58 (2.11) 1.85 (2.18) 
Salience    .43 (.22) .47 (.22)* 
     PO * salience    1.65 (.93) 1.35 (.89) 
Year   .11 (.10) .11 (.10) 
     PO * year   -1.14 (.49)* -1.20 (.47)* 
Issue intercept variance 3.30 (1.37)  2.46 (1.05) 2.37 (1.01) 
Issue PO slope variance 43.98 (24.84)  32.59 (18.88) 27.19 (17.59) 
Country intercept variance  .93 (.00)   
Country PO slope variance  .01 (.00)   
Intercept-slope covariance  4.25 (4.29) .08 (.00) 3.29 (3.47) 4.01 (3.27) 
Deviance 770 1035 745 688 
N level 1 (level 2) 491 (20) 491 (31) 491 (20) 457 (20) 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.0005. 
 
The likelihood-ratio test comparing model 2 to the equivalent model without the random 
variance components is insignificant12. In substantive terms, this means that there seems to be 
very little variation in the strength of the opinion-policy linkage across countries13. 
 
                                                 
12 Due to lack of variation between countries, we do not present a cross-classified model with random intercepts 
for both policy issues and countries. A robustness check with such a model yields findings in line with those 
presented. 
13 Since our sample has more countries than issues, we checked whether this might account for the fact that we 
find greater variation across issues than across countries. We sampled 20 countries randomly from the full set of 
observations, re-estimated the models and repeated the process 50 times. In only a negligible fraction of these 
models, cross-country variation was found significant, while cross-issue variation remained so. This implies that 
our results are not driven by the different numbers of issues and countries in our data. 
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Figure 1. Predicted coefficients (log-odds) of public opinion on the policy being in place for 
each issue, with 95% confidence intervals  
 
Notes: The dashed line indicates the mean coefficient across all issues. Coefficients are empirical Bayes 
predictions based on the coefficient of public opinion and its random slope variance in Model 1 (Table 1).  
 
Despite this observation, we might find that the opinion-policy relationship varies with political 
institutions when we control for the other institutions. In model 3, we test this by including 
interaction terms of each institutional indicator with the public opinion variable. We find that 
none of the institutions influences the relationship between public opinion and policy. This 
holds even when only including one indicator at a time (not shown). Only the control measure 
for the year significantly interacts with public opinion, suggesting that the opinion-policy link 
has become weaker over time. This might, however, be due to the expansion of the country 
sample. Model 4 is equivalent to model 3 but includes the measure of the legislature's influence 
instead of the regime type dummies. This variable does not seem to influence the relationship 
between opinion and policy either. 
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Figure 2. Predicted coefficients (log-odds) of public opinion on the policy being in place for 
each country, with 95% confidence intervals  
 
Notes: The dashed line indicates the mean coefficient. Coefficients are empirical Bayes predictions based on the 
coefficient of public opinion and its random slope variance in Model 2 (Table 3).  
 
As a robustness check14, we estimated a set of models equivalent to those in Table 1 but with a 
binary measure of policy (the one used to construct the congruence measure) and a multilevel 
logit specification. The results do not substantially differ15 except that the interaction term 
between public opinion and media salience is positive and significant at p < 0.05. 
                                                 
14 The statistically insignificant interaction terms indicate that the relationship between public opinion and policy 
does not significantly differ between different values on the institution variables. However, it might nevertheless 
be the case that the relationship is statistically significantly different from zero at some, but not other, values of 
the institution variables. We plot the average marginal effects of opinion on policy along the range of each 
institution measure in Online Appendix G. The relationship remains statistically significant and at similar levels 
throughout, except at very high values of the Gallagher Index and in presidential systems, where the coefficients 
are smaller and statistically insignificant, whereby the latter appears to be due to low numbers of observations. 
15 The mixed-effect models presented here exploit the between-country variation in institutions present in our 
dataset. We also estimated equivalent models with country fixed effects displayed in Online Appendix H, which 
also indicate that the opinion-policy relationship does not vary with institutional differences. 
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Explaining public opinion-policy congruence in Europe 
While it is reassuring that the likelihood of having a particular policy rises with public support, 
this is not a sufficient standard for policy to reflect the views of the citizens. We therefore 
examine to what extent existing policy is in line with the preferences of the majority and 
whether political institutions influence it. We find that in the majority (63 per cent) of cases, 
legislation is in line with the opinion of the majority of citizens (Table 2). A comparable study 
by Lax and Philips (2012) on the American states found congruence only about half of the time.  
While Table 2 shows that congruence varies across countries (from 41 per cent of issues 
in Italy and Poland to 100 per cent in Iceland, which is however an outlier and for which we 
have information on only a small number of issues), the differences across issues are again 
more striking: in only 7 per cent of countries is the law on warnings on alcohol bottles directed 
at drivers and pregnant women congruent with public opinion, whereas congruence exists in 
100 per cent of the countries for military involvement in Afghanistan. Figure 3 underlines that 
there are no clear patterns in congruence with regard to the different regions in Europe. 
This observation is confirmed by the results of multilevel logistic regression analyses with 
random intercepts at the levels of issues and countries, respectively (Table 3). While a 
substantial degree of variation in congruence can be accounted for by policy issues (model 5), 
a negligible share of it is related to countries (model 6), mirroring our findings in the analysis 
of the opinion-policy relationship. Thus, even though there is clearly some degree of variation 
in congruence across countries, as Table 2 shows, it does not appear to be systematic. It would 
therefore appear that countries’ institutional configurations have no net impact on whether 
policy corresponds with the majority opinion. However, in order to test whether individual 
political institutions affect it we again need to control for the others. As models 7 and 8 show, 
none of them do except one: countries with a bicameral system have a lower likelihood of 
opinion-policy congruence than countries with only one legislative chamber. 
This finding suggests that the checks and balances present in bicameral systems might 
make it more difficult for governments to provide the policies that the public wants. The average 
predicted probability of congruence (based on model 8), with the covariates at their observed 
levels, is 69 per cent in unicameral systems, whereas it is only 57 per cent in bicameral systems. 
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Table 2. Congruence by country and policy issue 
Country 
Congruence in 
% (no. of 
issues) 
Issue 
Congruence in 
% (no. of 
countries) 
Iceland 100 (4) Military involvement in Afghanistan 100 (15) 
Portugal 85 (20) Progressive income tax 94 (16) 
Estonia 77 (13) Nation-wide minimum wage 89 (27) 
Romania 77 (13) State support for caregivers 86 (28) 
France 75 (20) Embryonic stem cell research 81 (31) 
Sweden 75 (20) Nuclear power 81 (27) 
Austria 74 (19) Adoption of children by same-sex couples 77 (31) 
Greece 71 (17) Banning of tobacco sale through vending machines 74 (27) 
Hungary 71 (17) Abortion  74 (27)  
Malta 69 (13) Smoking bans in bars and pubs 68 (28) 
Netherlands 68 (19) Same-sex marriage 63 (27) 
Slovakia 67 (15) Detaining terrorist suspects without charge  56 (18) 
Cyprus 64 (14) Right to earn an income while receiving a pension 56 (16) 
Denmark 63 (19) Mandatory retirement age 53 (30) 
Finland 63 (19) Experiments on animals like monkeys and dogs 52 (31) 
Lithuania 62 (13) Online voting 44 (16) 
Bulgaria 60 (15) Ius soli  (citizenship on the basis of birth in a territory) 40 (20) 
Germany 60 (20) Asylum seekers’ right to work 38 (21) 
Spain 60 (20) Banning disposal of plastic waste in landfills 21 (28) 
Luxembourg 59 (17) Warnings on alcoholic drink bottles  7 (27) 
Croatia 57 (7)   
Latvia 56 (16)   
Norway 55 (11)   
UK 55 (20)   
Belgium 53 (17)   
Slovenia 53 (17)   
Switzerland 50 (6)   
Czech 
Republic 47 (17)   
Ireland 47 (19)   
Italy 41 (17)   
Poland 41 (17)   
Total  63 (20)  63 (31) 
 
We also find that policy is more likely to reflect the opinion of the majority of the public the 
larger the majority; this corresponds with the finding that the likelihood of policy being enacted 
21 
 
(not enacted) is correlated with the degree of support in favour of (against) it. Finally, 
congruence is more likely the more salient a policy issue is in the news media16. 
 
Table 3. Effects on public opinion-policy congruence 
 Model  
 5 6 7 8 
Opinion majority   3.48 (1.08)** 
3.90 
(1.14)*** 
Electoral system measure  (ENPP)    -.10 (.08) -.11 (.08) 
Regime type 
(reference=parliamentary)     
 
     Semi-presidential   .34 (.24)  
     Presidential   -.11 (.56)  
Legislature’s influence    -.14 (.08)  
Bicameralism   -.74 (.26)** -.66 (.27)* 
Federalism (reference=unitary)     
     Hybrid   .36 (.34) .32 (.33) 
     Federal   .62 (.36) .58 (.35) 
EU member   .53 (.41) .81 (.43)  
Salience    .49 (.14)*** .48 (.15)** 
Year   -.09 (.07) -.09 (.07) 
Intercept .63 (.28)* .51 (.09)*** .33 (.46) .18 (.47) 
Issue intercept variance 1.31 (.55)  .95 (.42) 1.06 (.47) 
Country intercept variance  .00 (.00)   
Deviance 582 650 547 505 
N level 1 (level 2) 491 (20) 491 (31) 491 (20) 457 (20) 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.0005. 
 
Conclusion 
Whereas the quality of democratic governance in Europe and elsewhere has been subject to 
much criticism, our study finds a positive, large and statistically significant association between 
public opinion and policy on a range of issues across the European continent. Moreover, in 
close to two-thirds of all cases policy is congruent with the majority opinion.  
                                                 
16 This effect is in line with the effect of salience we found in our robustness check using a dichotomous rather 
than an ordinal measure of policy as the dependent variable. That we find different effects of salience in Tables 1 
and 3 should not surprise us since even though ‘congruence with majority opinion’ and ‘the relationship between 
opinion and policy’ are related concepts, they measure different elements of the opinion-policy linkage (cf. Online 
Appendix A). The estimates of models using the alternative electoral system measures are provided in Online 
Appendix E. We also estimated a logistic regression model with country fixed effects, which includes the 
institutions with within-country variation from models 7 and 8 – namely ENPP and EU membership (Online 
Appendix H). Here, congruence increases significantly with EU membership. The results of the congruence 
analysis in Table 3 and in Online Appendix E are robust to excluding the opinion majority measure, which could 
be relevant if certain institutional set-ups were more conducive to larger opinion majorities (see Online Appendix 
J). The results also hold when only one predictor at a time is included (not shown). 
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Figure 3. Predicted coefficients (log-odds) of public opinion on the policy being in place for 
each country, with 95% confidence intervals  
 
Notes: Darker shades indicate higher opinion‐policy congruence (cf. Table 2). The mean level is 63 per cent 
(Denmark and Finland), the minimum is 41 per cent (Italy and Poland) and the maximum is 100 per cent 
(Iceland). 
 
Even though democratic politics is about more than the extent to which policies on specific 
issues reflect the wishes of the public, these results offer reassurance regarding the state of 
democratic governance in Europe. They indicate that the political institutions and practices in 
place are able to ensure, one way or another, that public opinion and policy do not deviate too 
much and too often from one another. 
Importantly, we do not find systematic variation across the 31 countries we study in the 
extent to which policy is correlated with public preferences or in the likelihood of congruence 
between opinion and policy. In contrast, we find significant differences in policy representation 
across the 20 policy issues that we study, which are only partly accounted for by the differences 
in overall media salience between the issues. The low country-level variation in the opinion-
policy link is intriguing because our sample of countries features both established and relatively 
young democracies from all corners of the European continent – from Norway to Portugal and 
from Ireland to Bulgaria. These countries display a lot of variation in terms of political 
institutions, which are often assumed to have important effects on the opinion-policy link. Yet, 
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apart from a relationship between the number of legislative chambers and congruence between 
policy and the majority opinion, we did not find evidence that institutions condition the opinion-
policy linkage. 
While there is increasing agreement that different electoral rules can generate high levels 
of left-right congruence between the government and the citizens (Golder & Lloyd 2014; Blais 
& Bodet 2006; Ferland 2016; Powell 2009), our results suggest that the policies in place also 
reflect public opinion to similar degrees in more and less proportional electoral systems. It thus 
appears that the factors that might obstruct responsive policy making in PR systems, such as 
the need to bargain, veto points and a low clarity of responsibility in multi-party governments, 
are balanced out by incentives to cater to specific constituencies rather than the median voter 
and other potential factors in majoritarian systems. 
Moreover, in systems where the legislature has more power over the executive, this presence 
of a veto player might hinder policy change that responds to public opinion, but at the same 
time it can prevent unpopular policies. Whether the public prefers policy change or the status 
quo might thus be decisive, and on the aggregate these dynamics might cancel each other out. 
Surprisingly, even the vertical division of powers does not appear to affect the opinion-policy 
linkage, although we expected that governments in countries with multilevel structures, and 
hence a lower clarity of responsibility, would have lower incentives to bring policy and public 
opinion in line. We thus conclude that policy may be in line with public opinion in a variety of 
different institutional contexts. Yet, this certainly does not mean that the quality of democracy 
does not vary across Europe. Even though correspondence between public opinion and policy 
is an important aspect of representative democracy, it is not sufficient if the procedural aspects 
of the democratic political process are not respected. 
Our results indicate that at any given point of time there might be no net differences in 
the aggregate opinion-policy linkage and congruence between countries with different 
institutions. Hence, while the institutions might have various well-defined effects, the results 
of their operation might not be different, on average, in the sample of countries that we have. It 
should also be acknowledged that institutions that produce year-to-year relationships between 
opinion and policy are not necessarily the same as institutions that co-occur with concurrent 
opinion-policy correspondence analysed in this study. Future research should therefore 
investigate the causes of the differences in opinion-policy linkage between issues as well as the 
patterns and relationships we observed in more detail – for example, by analysing whether and 
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how institutions and issue characteristics influence the different causal links between opinion 
and policy. Longitudinal research designs and in-depth case studies searching for direct 
evidence of policy makers listening to the public and the public adjusting its preferences to 
policy have great potential to address such questions (Rasmussen et al. 2018). Importantly, such 
work could also consider whether not only individual institutions but also specific 
configurations of institutions affect the linkage between opinion and policy. 
Moreover, it should be recognised that, beyond the difficulty of measuring comparative 
institutions, it is possible that the mechanisms through which institutional and issue 
characteristics influence this linkage vary between subsets of countries and issues. For instance, 
in countries where an institution has become consolidated and exerted its effects over many 
years, its potential to link opinion and policy might be different than in newly established 
democracies or countries where institutional changes took place recently. The fact that our 
sample is inclusive in terms of both issues and countries might also partly explain why our 
findings differ from those of some previous studies. Wlezien and Soroka (2012), for instance, 
who find effects of electoral system proportionality and executive power, include a smaller 
number of postcommunist countries. It is also possible that because we look further down the 
policy-making process than, for example, work that looks at agenda responsiveness, more 
institutional mechanisms may come into play and neutralise each other. Future research aiming 
at disentangling the potential countervailing effects of institutions should take such 
contingencies into consideration. 
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Online Appendices 
ONLINE APPENDIX A: The relationship and congruence between public 
opinion and public policy 
We use two distinct conceptions and measures of policy representation: a) The relationship 
between public opinion and policy, i.e. the degree to which a change in public support for a 
policy is correlated with a change in the likelihood of the policy being in place, and b) 
congruence between the majority of the public and the policy status quo. We can have different 
levels of congruence for the same relationship between opinion and policy. Similarly, the 
relationship between opinion and policy might vary between issues with the same level of 
congruence. Figure A1 illustrates this with five different scenarios represented in five panels.  
The two scenarios represented on the top row of Figure A1 have the same basic 
relationship between opinion and policy, represented by β, which is the regression coefficient 
for public support in a logistic regression of the presence of the policy on public support. But 
congruence differs: in scenario A it is 51%, while in scenario B it is 89%. Note that α is the 
regression coefficient for the intercept in the same logistic regression of policy on public 
support. The locations of the observations are indicated as ‘rugs’ at the top and bottom of each 
plot. 
The three scenarios depicted at the bottom row of Figure A1 have the same level of 
congruence (88%), but different relationships between opinion and policy. In scenario C, the 
regression coefficient β is 8, while in scenarios D and E it is 13. Furthermore, scenarios D and 
E have the same level of congruence and the same β, but differ in the estimates of the intercept, 
α.  
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Figure A1. Congruence and relationship between public opinion and policy under five different scenarios. 
Notes: Simulated data (N=400 for each panel). Observations represented by ‘rugs’ at the top and bottom of each panel. α and β are the intercept and public support 
coefficients, respectively, of logistic regressions of the presence of policy on public opinion support, estimated from the data for each panel.  
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ONLINE APPENDIX B: Policy scales  
 
Issue Original scale Three-point scale Binary scale 
Warnings on 
alcoholic drink 
bottles  
0=no warnings 
1=warnings 
0=no warnings 
1= -  
2=warnings 
0=no warnings 
1=warnings 
Experiments on 
animals like 
monkeys and 
dogs 
0=ban on experiments on 
monkeys and dogs  
1=ban on experiments on 
great apes and gibbons 
2=ban on experiments with 
great apes 
3=no ban 
0= ban on experiments on 
any monkeys and dogs or 
great apes and gibbons 
1= ban on experiments with 
great apes 
2=no ban 
0=ban on experiments 
on any monkeys and 
dogs 
1=no ban 
Smoking bans in 
bars and pubs 
0=no ban 
1=partial ban with many 
exceptions or not enforced 
2=partial ban with some 
exceptions 
3=ban, but separate 
smoking rooms (no 
exceptions for small 
premises) 
4=complete ban 
0=no ban 
1=partial ban with many 
exceptions or not enforced, 
or with some exceptions, or 
no exceptions but separate 
smoking rooms 
2=complete ban 
0=no ban or partial ban 
with many exceptions 
or not enforced 
1=partial ban with some 
exceptions or no 
exceptions but separate 
smoking rooms or 
complete ban 
Banning of 
tobacco sale 
through vending 
machines 
0=no ban 
1=restrictions 
2=ban 
0=no ban 
1=restrictions 
2=ban 
0=no ban or restrictions 
1=ban 
Embryonic stem 
cell research 
0=no ban 
1=no ban but restrictive 
2=ban but allowed with 
imported cells 
3=absolute ban 
0=no ban 
1=no ban but restrictive 
2=ban but allowed with 
imported cells or absolute 
ban 
0=no ban or no ban but 
restrictive 
1=ban but allowed with 
imported cells or 
absolute ban 
Nuclear power 
0=no nuclear energy with 
no plans to build or phase-
out plan 
1=no nuclear energy with 
no explicit policy 
2=nuclear energy and plan 
to continue or none but 
explicit plans to build 
0=no nuclear energy with 
no plans to build or phase-
out plan 
1=no nuclear energy with 
no explicit policy 
2=nuclear energy and plan 
to continue or none but 
explicit plans to build 
0=no nuclear energy 
with no plans to build or 
phase-out plan or no 
nuclear energy with no 
explicit policy 
1=nuclear energy and 
plan to continue or none 
but explicit plans to 
build 
Nation-wide 
minimum wage 
0=no minimum wage 
1=industry-wide  
2=national or industry-wide 
with coverage >90% 
0=no minimum wage 
1=industry-wide  
2=national or industry-wide 
with coverage >90% 
0=no minimum wage or 
industry-wide  
1=national or industry-
wide with coverage 
>90% 
State support to 
care for 
dependent 
persons 
0=no support 
1=support 
0=no support 
1 = - 
2=support 
0=no support 
1=support 
Detaining 
terrorist suspects 
indefinitely  
0=very short detention limit 
(<=3 days) 
1=short detention limit (4-
10 days) 
2=long detention limit (>10 
days) 
3=no detention limit 
0=very short or short 
detention limit (<= 10 days) 
1=long detention limit (>10 
days) 
2=no detention limit 
0=detention limit 
2=no detention limit 
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Same-sex 
marriage 
0=marriage legalized   
1=registered partnership 
2=not legalized 
3=prohibited 
0=marriage legalized   
1=registered partnership 
2=not legalized or 
prohibited 
0=marriage legalized   
1=registered partnership 
or not legalized or 
prohibited 
Adoption of 
children by 
same-sex 
couples 
0=not allowed 
1=only internal adoption 
2=internal and external 
0=not allowed 
1=only internal adoption 
2=internal and external 
0=not allowed or only 
internal adoption 
1=internal and external 
Abortion  
0=banned 
1=only if threat to life of 
mother 
2=only if threat to health of 
mother 
3=for social and economic 
reasons 
4=on request 
0=banned 
1=only if threat to health of 
mother or for social and 
economic reasons 
2=on request 
0=banned or only if 
threat to life or health of 
mother or for social and 
economic reasons 
1=on request 
Ius soli 
(citizenship on 
the basis of birth 
in a territory) 
0=only foundlings 
1=only stateless children 
2=only facilitated 
naturalization 
3=double ius soli 
4=weak ius soli 
5=strong ius soli 
6=unconditional ius soli at 
birth 
0=only foundlings or 
stateless children or 
facilitated naturalization 
1=double or weak ius soli 
2=strong or unconditional 
ius soli at birth 
0=only foundlings or 
stateless children or 
facilitated naturalization 
1=double, weak or 
strong or unconditional 
ius soli at birth 
Progressive 
income tax 
0=regressive tax 
1=flat tax 
2=progressive tax 
0=regressive tax 
1=flat tax 
2=progressive tax 
0=regressive or flat tax 
1=progressive tax 
The right to earn 
while receiving a 
pension 
0=not allowed to earn 
1=limit on earnings/penalty 
2=unlimited earnings 
0=not allowed to earn 
1=limit on earnings/penalty 
2=unlimited earnings 
0=not allowed to earn or 
limit on 
earnings/penalty 
21=unlimited earnings 
Asylum seekers’ 
right to work  
0=not allowed 
1=allowed under certain 
conditions 
2=allowed 
0=not allowed 
1=allowed under certain 
conditions 
2=allowed 
0=not allowed or only 
under strong conditions 
1=allowed under (weak) 
conditions or allowed 
On-line voting 0=no 1=yes 
0=no 
1= - 
2=yes 
0=no 
1=yes 
Military 
involvement in 
Afghanistan 
0=no 
1=yes 
0=no 
1= - 
2=yes 
0=no 
1=yes 
Mandatory 
retirement age 
0=none 
1=none, with few 
exceptions (e.g. military) 
2=for public servants 
and/or a considerable no. of 
professions based on 
collective agreements 
and/or employers may set 
one 
3=yes 
0=none or none with few 
exceptions (e.g. military) 
1=for public servants 
and/or a considerable no. of 
professions based on 
collective agreements 
and/or employers may set 
one 
3=yes 
0=none or none with 
few exceptions (e.g. 
military) 
1=for public servants 
and/or a considerable 
no. of professions based 
on collective 
agreements and/or 
employers may set one 
or yes 
Banning the 
disposal of 
plastic waste in 
landfills 
0=no 
1=yes 
0=no 
1= - 
2=yes 
0=no 
1=yes 
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ONLINE APPENDIX C: Descriptive information on public opinion, policy, 
and congruence 
 
Table C1. Descriptive information on public opinion, policy, and congruence  
Country Values Empirical range Mean (std. dev.) 
Public opinion 0-1 .05-.98 .63 (.22) 
Policy 0, 1, 2 0-2 1.00 (.89) 
Congruence 0, 1 0-1 .63 (.48) 
 
Table C2. Descriptive information on public opinion, policy, and congruence by country 
  Mean (standard error) 
Country No. of issues Public opinion Policy Congruence 
Austria 19 .59 (.06) .89 (.23) .74 (.10) 
Belgium 17 .62 (.04) .88 (.22) .53 (.12) 
Bulgaria 15 .73 (.05) 1.00 (.26) .60 (.13) 
Croatia 7 .56 (.11) .86 (.34) .57 (.20) 
Cyprus 14 .63 (.08) 1.00 (.23) .64 (.13) 
Czech Republic 17 .66 (.04) 1.00 (.21) .47 (.12) 
Denmark 19 .59 (.05) .79 (.20) .63 (.11) 
Estonia 13 .68 (.06) 1.08 (.26) .77 (.12) 
Finland 19 .60 (.05) 1.05 (.19) .63 (.11) 
France 20 .60 (.04) 1.25 (.20) .75 (.10) 
Germany 20 .63 (.05) 1.15 (.18) .60 (.11) 
Greece 17 .57 (.07) .94 (.23) .71 (.11) 
Hungary 17 .67 (.05) .88 (.24) .71 (.11) 
Iceland 4 .63 (.15) 1.25 (.48) 1.00 (.00) 
Ireland 19 .65 (.05) .79 (.20) .47 (.12) 
Italy 17 .61 (.05) .94 (.22) .41 (.12) 
Latvia 16 .67 (.06) .81 (.23) .56 (.13) 
Lithuania 13 .69 (.07) 1.23 (.28) .62 (.14) 
Luxembourg 17 .59 (.05) 1.06 (.20) .59 (.12) 
Malta 13 .60 (.08) 1.00 (.23) .69 (.13) 
Norway 11 .63 (.06) .91 (.28) .54 (.16) 
Poland 17 .68 (.05) 1.00 (.24) .41 (.12) 
Portugal 20 .62 (.05) .95 (.20) .85 (.08) 
Romania 13 .65 (.06) 1.23 (.26) .77 (.12) 
Slovakia 15 .69 (.05) 1.13 (.26) .67 (.13) 
Slovenia 17 .63 (.05) 1.00 (.23) .53 (.12) 
Spain 20 .62 (.05) .80 (.17) .60 (.11) 
Sweden 20 .64 (.05) .95 (.21) .75 (.10) 
Switzerland 6 .58 (.09) .50 (.34) .50 (.22) 
Netherlands 19 .64 (.05) 1.11 (.20) .68 (.11) 
UK 20 .68 (.05) 1.35 (.20) .55 (.11) 
Total  20 .63 (.01) 1.00 (.04) .63 (.02) 
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Table C3. Descriptive information on public opinion, policy, and congruence by issue 
  Mean (standard error) 
Issue No. of  countries Public opinion Policy Congruence 
Warnings on alcoholic drink bottles  27 .80 (.02) .15 (.10) .07 (.05) 
Experiments on animals like monkeys and 
dogs 31 .56 (.02) 1.68 (.12) .52 (.09) 
Smoking bans in bars and pubs 28 .68 (.02) .96 (.10) .68 (.09) 
Banning tobacco sale through vending 
machines 27 .61 (.02) 1.48 (.10) .74 (.09) 
Embryonic stem cell research 31 .44 (.02) .58 (.14) .81 (.07) 
Nuclear power 27 .46 (.04) 1.33 (.16) .81 (.08) 
Nation-wide minimum wage 27 .69 (.01) 1.85 (.09) .89 (.06) 
State support to care for dependent 
persons 28 .92 (.01) 1.71 (.13) .86 (.07) 
Detaining terrorist suspects indefinitely  18 .49 (.02) .11 (.08) .56 (.12) 
Same-sex marriage 27 .48 (.05) 1.44 (.14) .63 (.09) 
Adoption of children by same-sex couples 31 .33 (.04) .52 (.15) .77 (.08) 
Abortion  27 .86 (.02) 1.67 (.11) .74 (.09) 
Ius soli (citizenship on the basis of birth in 
a territory) 20 .82 (.02) .60 (.18) .40 (.11) 
Progressive income tax 16 .81 (.02) 1.88 (.13) .94 (.06) 
The right to earn while receiving a 
pension 16 .65 (.03) 1.00 (.26) .56 (.13) 
Asylum seekers’ right to work  21 .76 (.02) .76 (.15) .38 (.11) 
On-line voting 16 .48 (.03) .00 (.00) .44 (.13) 
Military involvement in Afghanistan 15 .38 (.05) .67 (.25) 1.00 (.00) 
Mandatory retirement age 30 .65 (.04) .50 (.10) .53 (.09) 
Banning disposal of plastic waste in 
landfills 28 .83 (.02) .50 (.17) .21 (.08) 
Total  31 .63 (.01) 1.00 (.04) .63 (.02) 
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ONLINE APPENDIX D: Values on institutional variables by country 
 
Table D1. Country values on institutional variables  
 
Effective 
number of 
parliamentary 
parties 
(ENPP)a 
Regime typeb 
Legislature’s 
influence over 
the executive 
Bicameralismb Federalismb 
Values 
1.99 – 9.05 
(observed 
values) 
0=parliamentary, 
1=semi-
presidential, 
2=presidential 
0 (least 
powerful) – 9 
(most powerful) 
0=no 
bicameralism, 
1=bicameralism 
0=unitary, 
1=hybrid, 
2=federal 
Source Bormann and Golder (2013) 
Cheibub, Gandhi 
and Vreeland 
(2010) 
Fish and 
Kroenig (2009) 
Johnson and 
Wallack (2006) 
Norris 
(2009) 
Austria 3.74 1 5 1 2 
Belgium 8.22 0 8 1 2 
Bulgaria 3.94 1 7 0 0 
Croatia 3.14 1 7 1 0 
Cyprus 3.83 2 1 0 0 
Czech Republic 3.49 0 8 1 0 
Denmark 5.15 0 8 0 0 
Estonia 4.31 0 8 0 0 
Finland 5.19 1 6 0 0 
France 2.66 1 3 1 0 
Germany 4.07 0 8 1 2 
Greece 2.49 0 8 0 0 
Hungary 2.44 0 8 0 0 
Iceland 3.96 1 - 0 0 
Ireland 3.17 1 8 1 0 
Italy 4.08 0 8 1 1 
Latvia 5.59 0 7 0 0 
Lithuania 5.70 1 6 0 0 
Luxembourg 3.87 0 - 0 0 
Malta 2.00 0 - 0 0 
Norway 4.52 0 7 0 0 
Poland 3.03 1 7 1 0 
Portugal 2.72 1 6 0 1 
Romania 3.55 1 6 1 0 
Slovakia 4.73 1 6 0 0 
Slovenia 4.58 0 7 1 0 
Spain 2.45 0 8 1 2 
Sweden 4.29 0 7 0 0 
Switzerland 5.03 2 6 1 2 
Netherlands 5.49 0 7 1 1 
UK 2.38 0 8 1 1 
a The values indicate the average ENPP value across all observations for a country. The measure used is ‘enpp1’ 
in Bormann and Golder’s dataset, which ‘corrects’ for the influence of independents and ‘other parties’ (cf. the 
codebook at http://mattgolder.com/elections). 
b The data is taken from the Quality of Government project (http://qog.pol.gu.se/data). 
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ONLINE APPENDIX E: Estimations with alternative electoral system 
measures 
 
Table E1. Effects on the relationship between public opinion and policy 
 PR/majoritarian system dummy Gallagher Index 
Average district 
magnitude 
Public opinion (PO) 5.45 (2.67)* 5.85 (2.73)* 5.52 (2.66)* 
Electoral system measure  .90 (.38)* .05  (.03) -.00 (.00) 
     PO * Electoral system measure  .50 (2.04) -.08 (.17) .01 (.02) 
Regime type 
(reference=parliamentary)    
     Semi-presidential .12 (.24) .19 (.24) .26 (.23) 
     Presidential -.15 (.55) -.08 (.56) -.08 (.55) 
     PO * semi-presidential -1.16 (1.23) -1.06 (1.22) -1.11 (1.20) 
     PO * presidential -2.25 (2.35) -2.47 (2.37) -2.31 (2.35) 
Bicameralism -.12 (.27) -.05 (.27) .10 (.26) 
     PO * bicameralism    -.43 (1.42) -.23 (1.41) -.53 (1.35) 
Federalism (reference=unitary)    
     Hybrid .36 (.33) .34 (.33) .42 (.35) 
     Federal .16 (.37) .09 (.36) -.08 (.35) 
     PO * hybrid  1.62 (1.63) 1.85 (1.63) 1.56 (1.73) 
     PO * federal 2.65 (1.87) 2.45 (1.86) 2.80 (1.83) 
EU member -.02 (.43) .10 (.43) .13 (.43) 
     PO * EU member .69 (2.13) .60 (2.11) .56 (2.11) 
Salience  .43 (.22)* .43 (.22)* .43 (.22)* 
     PO * salience  1.48 (.91) 1.52 (.92) 1.55 (.92) 
Year .12 (.10) .12 (.10) .11 (.10) 
     PO * year -1.13 (.48)* -1.17 (.49)* -1.14 (.48)* 
Issue intercept variance 2.40 (1.03) 2.39 (1.02) 2.38 (1.02) 
Issue PO slope variance 31.13 (18.13) 31.37 (18.27) 31.43 (18.33) 
Intercept-slope covariance  3.59 (3.33) 3.23 (3.34) 3.45 (3.34) 
Deviance 742 745 747 
N level 1 (level 2) 491 (20) 490 (20) 491 (20) 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.0005. 
 
The models in Tables 1 and 3 include the Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) 
in the last election prior to the year in which public opinion and policy are measured as the 
measure of electoral system proportionality. Here, the measure is replaced with three alternative 
measures in order to test the robustness of the results: (1) a dummy indicating whether the main 
system used for lower house elections in a country is based on plurality or PR rules (Keefer 
2015); (2) the Gallagher Index or Least Squares Index (Gallagher 2014), indicating the degree 
of vote-seat disproportionality of an election, at the last legislative election; and (3) a measure 
of the average district magnitude at the first tier at the last legislative election (Bormann and 
Golder 2013). In Table D1, Model 3 (Table 1) is replicated with these three measures. Table 
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E2 replicates Model 7 (Table 3). The estimates show that neither the relationship between 
public opinion and policy nor opinion-policy congruence are affected by variation in the 
electoral system.   
 
Table E2. Effects on public opinion-policy congruence 
 PR/majoritarian system dummy Gallagher Index 
Average district 
magnitude 
Opinion majority 3.48 (1.07)** 3.47 (1.07)** 3.47 (1.07)** 
Electoral system measure  .42 (.36) -.00 (.03) .00 (.00) 
Regime type (reference=parliamentary)       
     Semi-presidential .30 (.24) .37 (.24) .37 (.24) 
     Presidential -.12 (.56) -.13 (.56) -.10 (.56) 
Bicameralism -.79 (.27)** -.68 (.27)* -.69 (.26)** 
Federalism (reference=unitary)    
     Hybrid .33 (.33) .36 (.34) .33 (.35) 
     Federal .63 (.36) .51 (.36) .53 (.35) 
EU member .50 (.41) .56 (.41) .56 (.41) 
Salience  .49 (.14)** .48 (.14)** .48 (.14)** 
Year -.09 (.07) -.09 (.07) -.09 (.07) 
Intercept .34 (.46) .29 (.47) .28 (.46) 
Issue intercept variance .94 (.41) .93 (.41) .94 (.41) 
Deviance 547 549 549 
N level 1 (level 2) 491 (20) 490 (20) 491 (20) 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.0005. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX F: Salience measure based on the ‘most important 
problem’ item 
It is common in political science to use responses to the ‘most important problem’ (MIP) survey 
question as an indicator of the salience of an issue. We chose to use an indicator of the media 
salience of the policy issues in our sample instead, since we hypothesize that representation 
should function better if the public has more information about the issue at stake and about 
political elites’ positions and if policy-makers are, in turn, better informed about the preferences 
of the public. The media plays an important role in the transmission of this information. We 
nevertheless construct an alternative indicator using the MIP item.  
Obtaining data on the ‘most important problems’ of the publics from all countries 
included in our study over the time period covered (1998-2013) is problematic. The first option 
is to use data from the Eurobarometer, which started to regularly include the MIP item in 2002. 
In this case, we would need to use data on salience in 2002 for the issues where policy and 
public opinion were measured between 1998 and 2001 (4 issues). But the more serious problem 
is that the item in the Eurobarometer (EB) is closed-ended and includes a very limited range of 
broad policy categories EB 57.2, conducted in 2002, contains the following issue categories: 
(1) crime, (2) public transport, (3) economic situation, (4) rising prices/inflation, (5) taxation, 
(6) unemployment, (7) terrorism, (8) defense/foreign affairs, (9) housing, (10) immigration, 
(11) health care system, (12) educational system, (13) pensions, and (14) protecting the 
environment.  These categories change slightly over time. It is apparent that issues such as 
‘online voting’ or ‘adoption of children by single-sex couples’ do not easily fit into any of these 
categories.  
The other option is to use surveys that include open-ended items, where the response 
categories that were matched to the responses and are included in the dataset are generally more 
detailed. We chose this option and used the data from the European Election Studies (EES) 
from 1999, 2004, and 2009. We matched each policy issue in our sample with a response 
category in the last survey that was conducted before the respective policy and public support 
for it were measured. We then calculated the percentage of survey respondents in each country 
who mentioned the issue category among all respondents who gave a valid answer to the MIP 
question, which becomes the MIP salience measure. The policy issues and the response 
categories matched to them are listed in Table F1. 
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Table F1. List of policy issues and the issue categories matched to them that summarize 
responses to the ‘most important issue’ question in the European Election Studies (EES) 
Policy issue 
Year of 
public 
opinion 
and policy  
Year 
of 
EES 
MIP issue category 
Warnings on alcoholic drink bottles directed at pregnant 
women and drivers  2009 2009 Health care 
Experiments on animals like monkeys and dogs 2010 2009 Animals 
Smoking bans in bars and pubs 2008 2004 Health care 
Banning of tobacco sale through vending machines 2012 2009 Health care 
Embryonic stem cell research 2010 2009 Health care 
Nuclear power 2008 2004 Energy 
Nation-wide minimum wage 2010 2009 Wages and earnings 
State support for those who leave work to care for 
dependent persons 2007 2004 Welfare policy 
Detaining terrorist suspects indefinitely without charging 
them 2005-2008 2004 Terrorism 
Same-sex marriage 2009 2009 
Civil rights, civil 
liberties, rights in general; 
homosexuals 
Adoption of children by same-sex couples 2008-2009 2004 Politics of minorities 
Abortion  2009 2009 Abortion 
Ius soli (citizenship on the basis of birth in a territory) 2003-2005 1999 Politics of minorities/integration 
Progressive income tax 1998-2001 1999 Taxes 
The right to earn an unlimited income while receiving a 
pension 2001 1999 
Pensions, retirement 
policy, retirement options 
Asylum seekers’ right to work while waiting for the 
decision 2002-2003 1999 Immigration 
On-line voting 1999 1999 Other election-related issues 
Military involvement in Afghanistan 2001 1999 Defense and national security; foreign affairs 
Mandatory retirement age 2011 2009 Pensions; national employment policies 
Banning the disposal of plastic waste in landfills 2013 2009 Environment 
 
It is clear that the categories are still much broader than the policy issues in most cases, whereas 
in some they fit very well (in particular for the issue of abortion). It is therefore not surprising 
that the MIP salience variable is uncorrelated with the media salience variable (Pearson’s r=.02, 
p=.65), which measures the salience of the specific policy issues rather than the broader policy 
areas. The media salience measure is arguably not equally valid for all countries, since the 
Financial Times covers, and is read in, some countries more than in others. On these grounds, 
40 
 
it should have a particularly high degree of validity for the UK. Yet, even here, it is entirely 
uncorrelated with the MIP salience measure.  
 
Table F2. The effects of media and MIP salience on the relationship between opinion and 
policy 
 Model 
 1 2 3 4 
Public opinion (PO) 6.29 (1.71)*** 5.99 (1.83)** 5.32 (3.39) 4.15 (3.55) 
ENPP  -.05 (.09) -.04 (.09) -.02 (.09) -.02 (.09) 
     PO * ENPP  .60 (.48) .63 (.49) .75 (.49) .80 (.50) 
Regime type (reference=parliamentary)     
     Semi-presidential .35 (.26) .36 (.26)   
     Presidential -.37 (.82) -.25 (.84)   
     PO * semi-presidential -1.38 (1.32) -1.69 (1.34)   
     PO * presidential -2.32 (4.98) -3.69 (5.24)   
Legislature’s influence   -.14 (.08) -.15 (.09) 
     PO * legislature’s influence   .13 (.44) .22 (.45) 
Bicameralism .02 (.28) .04 (.28) .17 (.29) .18 (.29) 
     PO * bicameralism    -.12 (1.46) -.06 (1.49) -.27 (1.50) -.26 (1.53) 
Federalism (reference=unitary)     
     Hybrid .01 (.35) -.06 (.36) .07 (.35) .02 (.36) 
     Federal -.00 (.38) .02 (.39) -.04 (.38) -.01 (.38) 
     PO * hybrid  1.34 (1.67) 1.79 (1.72) 1.29 (1.67) 1.73 (1.71) 
     PO * federal .68 (1.99) .70 (2.01) .66 (1.98) .81 (2.00) 
Media salience  .39 (.22)  .42 (.22)  
     PO * media salience  1.17 (.83)  .82 (.80)  
MIP salience  .06 (.03)*  .05 (.03) 
     PO * MIP salience  -.17 (.15)  -.10 (.15) 
Year .04 (.10) .04 (.11) .04 (.10) .04 (.11) 
     PO * year -1.09 (.44)* -1.10 (.48)* -1.15 (.44)** -1.12 (.48)* 
Issue intercept variance 2.45 (1.10) 3.45 (1.53) 2.46 (1.10) 3.37 (1.48) 
Issue PO slope variance 19.53 (15.07) 27.60 (20.32) 16.35 (15.04) 24.12 (19.50) 
Intercept-slope covariance  4.28 (3.18) 6.46 (4.42) 4.80 (3.08) 6.62 (4.19) 
Deviance 620 618 577 578 
N level 1 (level 2) 397 (20) 397 (20) 375 (20) 375 (20) 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.0005.  
This suggests that the MIP salience measure is not a good indicator of the salience of the policy 
issues in the public debate – and especially in the media. 
In Tables F2 and F3, we re-estimate the models from Tables 1 and 3 that estimate the 
effects of salience on the opinion-policy relationship and congruence, respectively, substituting 
the MIP salience measure for the media salience measure. We also report the results of the 
models using the media salience measure on the same sample, since the sample decreases from 
491 to 397 cases when using the MIP salience measure because the EES do not include all 
countries (most importantly, it only includes EU member states, which is why the EU dummy 
is excluded from the models). We find that neither the media salience nor the MIP measure 
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moderate the relationship between opinion and policy in the reduced sample, no matter whether 
the model includes the regime type dummies (Models 1 and 2, Table F2) or the indicator of the 
legislature’s influence (Models 3 and 4).  
 
Table F3. The effects of media and MIP salience on public opinion-policy congruence 
 Model 
 5 6 7 8 
Opinion majority 3.24 (1.17)** 3.08 (1.21)* 3.63 (1.23)** 3.43 (1.26)** 
ENPP -.03 (.08) -.03 (.08) -.05 (.09) -.05 (.09) 
Regime type 
(reference=parliamentary)   
  
     Semi-presidential .25 (.26) .24 (.26)   
     Presidential -.86 (.78) -.81 (.78)   
Legislature’s influence   -.05 (.08) -.05 (.08) 
Bicameralism -.79 (.29)** -.78 (.29)** -.81 (.30)** -.80 (.30)** 
Federalism 
(reference=unitary)   
  
     Hybrid .35 (.37) .32 (.37) .30 (.36) .27 (.36) 
     Federal .41 (.38) .41 (.39) .39 (.38) .39 (.38) 
Media salience  .43 (.14)**  .43 (.15)**  
MIP salience  .04 (.04)  .04 (.04) 
Year -.12 (.07) -.13 (.08) -.12 (.07) -.12 (.08) 
Intercept 1.01 (.31)** 1.00 (.35)** 1.15 (.31)*** 1.14 (.35)** 
Issue intercept variance .84 (.40) 1.40 (.63) .95 (.45) 1.48 (.66) 
Deviance 449 455 419 425 
N level 1 (level 2) 397 (20) 397 (20) 375 (20) 375 (20) 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.0005. 
 
In Table F3, we find that media salience maintains its significant positive effect on 
congruence in the reduced sample (Models 5 and 7). MIP salience, on the other hand, does not 
influence the relationship. Since the positive effect of issue salience on the strength of the 
opinion-policy link has been shown in a range of studies using different data and focusing on 
different periods and countries (e.g. Lax and Phillips 2012; Page and Shapiro 1983), this finding 
can be considered support for the claim that the media salience indicator is a more valid measure 
of our concept than the MIP salience variable.  
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ONLINE APPENDIX G: Marginal effects plots of interactions 
 
 
Figure G1. Marginal effects of public opinion on the probabilities of no policy, partial policy, 
and policy in different electoral systems 
Notes: Average marginal effects with covariates at their observed values and 95% confidence intervals. (a) is 
based on Model 3 (Table 1); (b), (c), and (d) on equivalent models with ENPP replaced by the respective 
measure. ENPP is grand mean-centered. 
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Figure G2. Marginal effects of public opinion on the probabilities of no policy, partial policy, 
and policy in different regime types 
Notes: Average marginal effects with covariates at their observed values and 95% confidence intervals. (a) is 
based on Model 3, (b) on Model 4 (Table 1). Legislature’s influence is grand mean-centered. 
 
 
Figure G3. Marginal effects of public opinion on the probabilities of no policy, partial policy, 
and policy along variation in bicameralism, federalism, and EU membership status 
Notes: Average marginal effects based on Model 3 (Table 1) with covariates at their observed values and 95% 
confidence intervals.  
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ONLINE APPENDIX H: Specifications with country fixed effects 
 
Table H1. Ordinal logit regression with country fixed effects and robust standard errors 
(equivalent to Models 3 and 4 in Table 1)  
 Model 
 3 4 
Public opinion (PO) 4.25 (2.10)* 3.34 (2.22) 
PO * ENPP  .13 (.37) .06 (.41) 
Regime type (reference=parliamentary)   
     PO * semi-presidential -.16 (.99)  
     PO * presidential -.83 (2.03)  
     PO * legislature’s influence  .00 (.31) 
PO * bicameralism    .24 (1.11) .16 (1.17) 
Federalism (reference=unitary)   
     PO * hybrid  .13 (1.34) -.03 (1.36) 
     PO * federal .18 (1.54) .07 (1.53) 
PO * EU member 1.10 (2.04) 2.29 (2.27) 
Salience  .35 (.06)*** .36 (.06)*** 
     PO * salience  .65 (.27)* .63 (.31)* 
Year .11 (.04)** .12 (.04)** 
     PO * year -1.24 (.21)*** -1.31 (.21)*** 
Deviance 892 817 
N  491 457 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.0005 
Notes: Models include country fixed effects and robust standard errors. 
 
 
Table H2. Logistic regression with country fixed effects and robust standard errors (equivalent 
to Models 7 and 8 in Table 3, excluding variables with no within-country variation)  
Opinion majority 2.06 (.80)* 
ENPP  -.11 (.22) 
EU member 1.24 (.58)* 
Salience  .39 (.06)*** 
Year -.07 (.03)* 
Intercept -.05 (.82) 
Deviance 568 
N  487 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.0005.  
Notes: Models include country fixed effects and robust standard errors. Iceland is excluded because its 
observations are predicted perfectly. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX J: Congruence models excluding opinion majority 
 
Table J1. Effects on public opinion-policy congruence without the opinion majority measure 
(equivalent to Models 7 and 8 in Table 3 and models in Table E2)  
 ENPP PR/majoritarian system dummy 
Gallagher 
Index 
Average 
district 
magnitude 
Electoral system measure  -.10 (.08) -.11 (.08) .42 (.36) -.01 (.03) .00 (.00) 
Regime type 
(reference=parliamentary)         
     Semi-presidential .35 (.24)  .31 (.24) .39 (.24) .38 (.23) 
     Presidential -.06 (.56)  -.07 (.56) -.09 (.56) -.04 (.56) 
Legislature’s influence  -.13 (.08)    
Bicameralism -.79 (.26)** -.73 (.27)** -.84 (.27)** -.72 (.27)** -.74 (.26)** 
Federalism 
(reference=unitary)      
     Hybrid .35 (.34) .29 (.33) .32 (.33) .36 (.34) .31 (.35) 
     Federal .55 (.35) .49 (.35) .56 (.35) .43 (.36) .46 (.34) 
EU member .51 (.40) .79 (.42) .48 (.40) .54 (.40) .53 (.40) 
Salience  .41 (.13)** .40 (.14)** .41 (.13)** .41 (.13)** .41 (.13)** 
Year -.08 (.06) -.08 (.06) -.08 (.06) -.08 (.06) -.08 (.06) 
Intercept .35 (.45) .22 (.46) .36 (.45) .32 (.46) .29 (.45) 
Issue intercept variance .83 (.37) .92 (.41) .82 (.37) .81 (.37) .82 (.37) 
Deviance 559 518 559 560 560 
N level 1 (level 2) 491 (20) 457 (20) 491 (20) 490 (20) 491 (20) 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.0005. 
 
 
